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COMMENT
THE FAULTY FOCUS OF FOOD REGULATION:
THE REGULATORY ROADBLOCK TO
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION
Reed M. Marburyt
I. INTRODUCTION

"Social fashion, delusion, and propaganda have combined to persuade
the public that our agriculture is for the best of reasons the envy of the
Modern World.... What these men are praising... is a disaster that is both
agricultural and cultural."'
If abundant crops and a deluge of cheap food were the standards of
success, surely the American farming story would be the pinnacle of
success.' But the underside of what is perceived as success can reveal the
subtle and deceptive delusion of a limited perspective. The family farm has
undergone a dramatic transformation over the past century and with it, so
to has our entire way of life. The industrial revolution hit the world of
agriculture and shifted the foundation by which the farm-food industry
works.3 Today, consumers spend less of their income on food than ever
before in history, and farmers also receive a smaller percentage of this
reduced budget item.4 What could once be summarized in words of selfsufficiency, community, and local was replaced with what can essentially be
summarized as specialized, consolidated, contracting, integrated, and
globalized.' These new aims of agriculture shifted the emphasis from quality
to quantity-failing to understand that to "pursue quantity alone is to
destroy those disciplines in the producer that are the only assurance of

t Business Manager, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 9; J.D. Candidate,

Liberty University School of Law (2015); B.B.A., Financial Management, University of New
Mexico (2009).
1.

RONALD JAGER, THE FATE OF FAMILY FARMING: VARIATIONS ON AN AMERICAN IDEA

195 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting WENDELL BERRY, THE UNSETTLING OF AMERICA
(1977)).

2.
3.
4.
5.

Id.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 195-96.
Id. at 196.
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quantity."6 "But any abundance, in any amount, is illusory if it does not
safeguard its producers, and in American agriculture it is now virtually the
accepted rule that abundance will destroy its producers. 7 As the personal
source of the food on our table was replaced with an impersonal and
anonymous system, questions of safety and adulteration arose, and so too
arose a system of regulation to meet it.
This Comment will look at the history of food regulation in the United
States as it relates to the political influences at various times and in various
ways with the object of looking at the scope of legitimate State regulation of
food safety and some potential limitations of the State's power to regulate.
Part II looks at the various steps in the regulatory history of America that
contributed to our current view of regulation and the context in which these
steps arose. Part III identifies the difficulty in regulation and the political
nature of regulatory standards at a federal level, looking at what can perhaps
be identified as a pretext of safety in some legislation. Part IV offers a
change in direction for safety regulation, with a call to reclaim the liberty to
take personal responsibility in food safety decisions, a call to remove
artificial infrastructure requirements, and a call to allow exceptions for
informed consent of the consumer for food products.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Theories of Regulatory Necessity
There are essentially two categories of theories on the reason for, or
origins of, federal regulation-"market failure" theories and political
theories.8 This first category is the traditional view of regulation, described
as the "market failure" theory of regulation, which espouses that regulatory
measures are necessary to correct perceived failures in the market that
impede market efficiency.' There are three categories of perceived market
failures that "market failure" economists have identified as primary: (1)
natural monopoly, (2) imperfect information, and (3) externalities." In the
area of food-safety regulation, it is this second category that most often
6. WENDELL BERRY, THE UNSETTLING OF AMERICA: CULTURE & AGRICULTURE 42
(softcover ed. 1986).
7. Id. Berry is referring to the destiuction of smaller producers through consolidation
and the degradation of the disciplines that insure quality in any industry. Id. at 41-42.
8. ROBERT E. LITAN & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 36
(1983).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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comes into play as justification for government intervention.' The
supporters' theory for regulation is that the "efficiency of a market economy
requires that all market participants possess the information necessary to
make reasoned choices. "12
The political theories about the necessity of regulation identify special
interest as the root of regulation. These theories identify regulatory
measures as growing from the efforts of certain special interest groups
because of the benefits that regulation will have on them specifically, in
contrast to the theoretical general economic efficiency goal of the "market
failure" theory. 3
One author describes the "market theory" of regulation this way: "Safety
regulation aims not at suppressing crimes involving private force and fraud,
but at forcibly altering certain resource allocations that have resulted from
peaceful, voluntary interactions among suppliers and demanders of goods
or services in the market." 4 Thus, the two views of regulatory necessity can
be summarized as stemming from a theory that the market fails to naturally
provide something necessary, or that capitalists are exploiting the market."5
This Comment focuses on regulation related to food safety.
B. HistoricalContext of Food Safety: The Shift from Family to Factory Farm
One cannot really consider elements of food safety and regulatory measures
without looking at the context from which that food is derived. The twentieth
century ushered in a fundamental shift in the paradigm of food production
from the family farm to what more resembles a factory farm, even though
often still owned by a family.'6 During the nineteenth century, almost all food
was grown for one's own family, or grown by a family farmer in the local
community. 7 At the local level, the methods, nature, and quality of the food
11. Final Regulation Agency Background Document, Virginia Regulatory Town Hall,
May
28,
2003,
http://townhaU.virginia.gov/1/GetFile.cfin?File=C:%5CTownHall%
5Cdocroot%5C48%5C588%5C2413%SCAgencyStatement_ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
12. LITAN &NORDHAUS, supra note 8, at 36.
13. Id. at 39-40.
14. JAMES ROLPH EDWARDS, REGULATION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE ECONOMY: THE

(1998).
15. Id.
16. Nicholas Obolensky, The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011: Too Little, Too
Broad, Too Bad, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 887, 888 (2012); BERRY, supra note 6, at 36;
Susan A. Schneider, A Reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of Food,
Farming, and Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 935, 943 (2010). This
article discusses how the family farm was redefined during this time. Id.
17. Obolensky, supra note 16, at 888.
REGULATORY ROAD TO SERFDOM 118
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were not really questionable because there was immediate transparency and
accountability.18 Yet, as urban populations began to grow, the farmers began
to adopt the industrial methods of the cities in their farming practices." This
industrial system would prove dangerous for food production, and the
geographical disconnect between the buyer and the producer would shield
unscrupulous producers from customer scrutiny.20 Applying this large-scale,
mechanized model to food production had, and continues to have, major
negative consequences on society."
C. Regulation in the United States
It is necessary to look back further than the societal issues of the
twentieth century to understand the origin and progression of regulation,
both generally and specifically, regarding food safety.
1. The Regulatory Inheritance of the United States
a.

Medieval mercantilism

Government regulation is not a modern phenomenon of Western
Civilization.22 Business regulation was pervasive in the mercantile states of
the late medieval economies.23 In the mercantile system, a dubious union
was forged between the merchants and the monarchs.2 4 This union brought
about the removal of most of the local trade barriers, but erected barriers to
imports at the national level in their place; thus, the economic stagnation of
the medieval times was maintained.25 "The monarchs systematically granted
and enforced monopolies and cartels over various lines of commerce,
industry, and skilled trades to favored individuals and producer groups."26
The groups who offered the highest bribes and agreed to be taxed at the
highest rates attained these monopolies.2 7 Bribes, or contributions, of this
nature will be referred to as political rent-seeking. The cartels and
monopolies, true to their nature, would then decrease output and raise price
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 887-88.
Id. at 888.
Id.
BERRY, supra note 6, at 41.
EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
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levels to extract higher profits from a populace that was largely powerless to
do anything about it. 28 This profit-seeking practice was paired with the
mercantile system of heavily restricting imports while maximizing exports,
resulting in a futile protectionist policy aimed at the accumulation of gold.29
b. From mercantilism to classical liberal philosophy
As we know from mercantilism being a vestige of the past, the strict
control of the monarchies and merchants was not strong enough to make
up for the inherent faults of the mercantile system. 0 Mercantilism, and
monarchy itself, began to give way to the rise of classical liberal political
philosophy of natural rights, individualism, and constitutionally limited
democratic government.3' Thousands of years of economic stagnation had
resulted in a belief that the wealth of the world was a fixed sum, with
conquest or exploitation being the only means of gaining wealth.2 This
paradigm was proven false with the rise of the economic philosophy taught
in Adam Smith's book, The Wealth of Nations.33
c.

Regulatory perspective in early America

The founders of the American Republic had knowledge of and direct
experience with the evils of mercantilism, and did their best to end them in
America.34 Still, many of the earlier colonies began levying restrictions on
imports from other colonies by the time of the Constitutional Convention,
and so the founders added the Commerce Clause to restrict any regulation
of interstate commerce to Congress and not to the individual states.35 Seen
through the lens of guarding against the temptations of mercantilism, much
of the basic structure of the Constitution was arguably intended to prevent
mercantile practices-such as the ability of the government to grant favors
to special interest groups. 6 Thus, the protection of private property, the
freeing of the market, and the reduction of political rent-seeking created an
atmosphere of innovation and entrepreneurship in early America-an
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.

32. Id. at 6.

33. Id. The "basic principles of an economy based on private property and voluntary
exchange in open, competitive markets" being implemented demonstrated that there could
be an "increase in world production, from which all nations could gain ....Id.
34. Id. at 7.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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atmosphere made possible by Congress having a very narrow interpretation
of its power to regulate interstate commerce, thus leaving safety regulation
3
to the states through their police powers. 1
Although constitutional interpretation in both the executive and judicial
branches was to limit federal and state regulation prior to the Civil War,
there were some notable forms of regulation that were not stamped out in
early America. 3' The modern ability to grant or withhold a business license
is a remnant of states having a right to grant or withhold corporate
charters.39 The states also subsidized infrastructure development-most
notably with the railroad industry-before the federal government began to
engulf these areas of regulation.40 These subsidy programs resulted in a
lower quality and far less efficient railway construction process. 4
Regulation of food adulteration fell under the police power reserved to the
states, until a shift in Commerce Clause jurisprudence led to the expansion
of the federal government in this area.42
2. The Progression of Federal Purported Food Safety Regulation
With the paradigm shift of Commerce Clause jurisprudence came federal
involvement in things that were practically entirely safety related, but
viewed by the court as having some effect on interstate commerce.43 Still, it
was not until 1906 that federal food regulation in America really came onto
the scene in earnest." On June 30, 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt
signed both the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act into
law. The FDA claims that adulteration of food-packing plants and baseless
cure-all claims on drugs was common practice at the time, and the
discovery of these undesirable methods led to the enactment of these two

37. Id. at 7-8.

38. Id. at 9.
39. Id.

40. Id.
41.

Id.; THOMAS

E.

WOODS, JR., THE POLITICALLY INCORRECT GUIDE TO AMERICAN

94-95 (2004). "The government subsidies introduced perverse incentives," since
railways were compensated based on the amount of track they laid, with no real emphasis on
HISTORY

quality and an efficient route. Id. at 94. In fact, circuitous routes were incentivized by this
policy. Id.
42. See Jim Chen, Filburn'sLegacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 1743-44 (2003).
43. Id. at 1744.
44. Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
[hereinafter FDA Dates] (Nov. 6, 2012),

http:// www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/milestones/ucm128305.htm.
45. Id.
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laws.' Dr. Harvey W. Wiley, who became known as the "Father of the
FDA," was largely responsible for the text of the Act. 47 In this, the FDA
holds a different view of his place in the history of regulation than Dr.
Wiley does himself. By March of 1912, just a little over five years after the
law had been implemented, Dr. Wiley regretfully resigned from his
position, expressing his belief that he could "find opportunity for better and
more effective service to the work which [was] nearest [his] heart, namely,
the pure food and drug propaganda, as a private citizen than [he] could any
longer find in [his] late position."4" Dr. Wiley went on to explain, in his
resignation and a later book expos6, that the plain provisions of the Act had
been undermined time after time.4 9 The authority the Act placed in the
Bureau of Chemistry, headed by Dr. Wiley, to determine whether a product
was adulterated or misbranded was usurped as products that the Bureau
concluded to be misbranded or adulterated were given approval by various
secretaries of the executive office."0 Thus, the Act was effectively nullified as
pressure from various lobbyists led to concessions and exceptions to the
rule for large players in the targeted industries of the time.5 ' This rentseeking activity of private interests quickly led to a selective enforcement
and disregard of the law for those with enough political influence at various
levels of government. 2 Thus, the law intended to protect the health of the
people was "perverted to protect adulteration of food and drugs." 3 It has
46. Id.
47. Harvey W. Wiley: PioneerConsumer Activist, FDA Consumer Magazine, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (Jan.-Feb., 2006), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History
/CentennialofFDA/HarveyW.Wley/ucm081121 .htm.
48. HARVEY W. WILEY, THE HISTORY OF A CRIME AGAINST THE FOOD LAW: THE AMAZING
STORY OF THE NATIONAL FOOD AND DRUGS LAW INTENDED TO PROTECT THE HEALTH OF THE
PEOPLE, PERVERTED TO PROTECT ADULTERATION OF FOODS AND DRUGS 92 (1929).

49. Id. at 93.
50. Id.at 89, 97.
51. Id. at 95-97, 106-07.
52. Id. at 398-400.

[Tihe precise nature of the political corruption needs to be understood. Every
act of political rent-seeking involves two sets of parties, including one or more
private citizens and one or more politicians. It is not clear a priori which
initiates the transaction.
It is too easily asserted .. .that the sequence of ideological change is:
businessmen corrupt the political process, public finds out, and interventionist,
anti-business sentiment is stimulated.
EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 200.

53. WILEY, supra note 48, at title page. Noted Austrian Economics professor Ludwig von
Mises speaks to this: "But the very existence of a government apparatus of coercion and
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been, and likely will always be, the primary political problem of the ages:
"how to prevent the rulers from turning into despots and making the state
totalitarian."54
Due to these developments following the passage of the Pure Food and
Drug Act, it lacked real teeth and Congress viewed the Act as obsolete by
1933. s5 Congress began work on a revamped regulatory act. 6 The efforts of
Congress were accelerated in 1937 when 107 people, many of whom were
children, died after consuming a product called Elixir of Sulfanilamide that
contained a poisonous solvent.57 Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act with its stated purpose to "protect the public health by
ensuring that-foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly labeled."5
This new Act contained many new provisions and expanded the scope of
the previous Pure Food and Drug Act.59 Some of the new expanded
provisions included ones that extended regulatory control to cosmetics and
therapeutic devices, required drugs to be shown safe before marketing,
provided for safe tolerances to be set for unavoidable poisonous substances,
authorized standards of identity and quality for foods, and authorized
factory inspections. 0 This Act has been amended over thirty times since its
enactment, with each amendment expanding the authority and detail of the
regulations in place.6"
With the traction gained in this new expansive view of food regulation,
the newly renamed Food and Drug Administration, and Congress, began
shaping and expanding the regulatory climate of food in America.62 Yet, for
all the purported advances in safety and methodology, the American food
compulsion makes a new problem arise. The men handling this apparatus yield too easily to
the temptation of misusing their power. They turn their weapons against those whom they
were expected to serve and to protect." LUDWIG VON MISES, ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND
INTERVENTIONISM 67 (Bettina Bien Greaves, ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 1990).
54. Id.
55. FDA Dates, supra note 44.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2) (2006).
59. FDA Dates, supra note 44; PATRICIA A. CURTIS & WENDY DUNLAP, GUIDE TO FOOD
LAWS AND REGULATIONS

31 (2005). Specifically, the Act added provisions that: (1) required

safe tolerances be set for unavoidable poisonous substances, (2) authorized standards of
identity, quality, and fill-of-container for foods, (3) authorized factory inspections, (4) added
the remedy of court injunctions to the previous penalties of seizures and prosecutions, and
(5) expanded the definitions of adulteration and misbranding. Id.
60. FDA Dates, supra note 44.
61. Obolensky, supra note 16, at 888-89.
62. Id.
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system is still plagued with outbreak after outbreak of food-borne illnesses,
often from what seem like the most unlikely of candidates, such as
jalapefios.63 And so, after many decades of incrementally building upon the
Act of 1938, Congress passed another overhaul of the regulatory landscape
in 2010 with the Food Safety Modernization Act (the "FSMA"). 6
The FSMA is a one-size-fits-all approach to food safety that does not
really distinguish the small family farm from the large factory farm as far as
safety requirements are concerned. 5 One of the key elements of the FSMA
is the requirement that food production facilities implement preventative
controls to essentially identify and eliminate high-risk areas in the
production line. 66 The FSMA provides for increased mandatory inspection
frequency, broader access to records, and testing by accredited laboratories
in order to ensure compliance with the new preventative controls
requirement. 67 The full effects of this legislation have not yet been felt
because much of the language is vague and will need to be interpreted and
implemented before it will be fully defined.6 ' This is especially dubious due
to the vast amount of agency discretion it gives to the FDA in further
clarifying and enforcing the FSMA. 69 As respected economist F.A. Hayek
63. Id. at 889.
64. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011)
("amend[ing] the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect to the safety of the
food supply.").
65. Obolensky, supra note 16, at 890. The bill included an amendment, called the TesterHagan amendment, that appeared to distinguish between requirements based on the size of
the operation (in gross income), but the amendment is largely ineffective due to being too
limited within the full scope of the FSMA and being undermined by broad agency discretion
within that limited scope of the bill to which the amendment applies. Id.; see Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 350h(f) (2012) (showing the terms of the exemption
allowed). One of the key elements of the FSMA requires facilities and producers to develop
internal hazard analysis and risk-based control plans (HARCP) that require the business to
identify points in the system that could pose some danger, and to develop controls and plans
to prevent those potential dangers from realizing. 21 U.S.C. § 350g(b)-(c) (2012).
Technically, this is the only portion of the FSMA that small producers are somewhat exempt
from under § 350h(f) of the FFDC, and yet within the exemption, qualified facilities must
still submit documentation proving that they qualify and either submit what looks strikingly
similar to the HARCP they are supposed to be exempt from, or declare compliance with
other applicable laws and display various information on a label. Obolensky, supra note 16,
at 901-02. But at the end of the day, the FDA has the discretion to withdraw the exemption if
the Secretary determines that it is necessary to protect public health. Id. at 902.
66. Id. at 892.
67. Id. at 893.
68. Id. at 922.
69. Id. at 921-22.
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declares, "We have progressively abandoned that freedom in economic
affairs without which personal and political freedom has never existed in
7°
the past."
3. The Philosophy of Safety Regulation
It is important to realize that the view of regulation that has dominated
from the Meat Inspection Act of 1906 to today comes from the perspective
of the regulators. 7' This has been the view taught in public schools and
continually repeated by the agencies whose very existence depends on the
survival of a philosophic and politic support for the need of regulation.72
The Meat Inspection Act of 1906 arose from a public outcry following
the publishing of the novel The Jungle by Upton Sinclair.73 The Jungle tells a
story of a corrupt oligopoly of Chicago meat packing firms that dominated
the industry, treated their workers like animals, and operated the facility
with complete disregard of public health and safety in the unsanitary
slaughtering and packing of meat. 4 Sinclair was, and is, seen by most as a
courageous journalist who investigated and exposed these conditions to the
public. 75 While there are some elements of truth in this story concerning the
messy nature of slaughterhouses-especially at this time 76 -Sinclair's efforts
over two years to infiltrate and gather evidence against the meat packers
were wholly unsuccessful. In the end, the best Sinclair could come up with
was a collection of slanderous, unproven accusations in an openly fictional
story.77
Sinclair was a socialist ideologue, intent on vilifying the large Chicago
meat packing firms, and his story was successful in stirring the public to
outrage at this perceived danger and injustice. 78 Although Sinclair's main
goal was to incite outrage over the working conditions, the public was
stirred to action primarily in response to his stories about the safety of the

70. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 16 (50th Anniversary ed. 1994).
71. EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 50-51.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 56-57.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 56.
76. Id. at 57.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 56-57; see JAYSON LUSK, THE FOOD POLICE: A WELL-FED MANIFESTO ABOUT THE
POLITICS OF YOUR PLATE 49 (2013). Sinclair's main purpose was to promote socialism, as

evidenced by the main character in The Jungle "eventually converting to the cause and going
by the name Comrade Jurgis." Id.
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food.79 Sinclair later lamented, "I aimed at the public's heart, and by
accident I hit it in the stomach."8" It was never shown, however, that the
Chicago meat packing firm growth had been associated with any increased
risks for workers in the plants, or consumers of the meat." In fact, the rapid
growth of the firms was a result of efficiency and innovation such as
refrigerated packing plants and railroad cars, the canning process, and the
use of chemical preservatives.82 This natural market competition resulted in
a decrease in the health risks in the production and consumption of the
meat products. 3
The biggest distortion of the facts surrounding the aftermath of The
jungle and the public outcry that followed is the idea that the Meat
Inspection Act was aimed against these big firms in the Chicago area, when
in fact, these firms were in favor of the Meat Inspection Act and had worked
to obtain it.8 4 These firms had already been subjected to federal, state, and
local government inspectors for more than a decade.85 Furthermore, the big
firms believed the laws would help them against their foreign and domestic
competitors, as well as provide a general public relations boon after the
market for meat plummeted in response to The Jungle. 6 It was not
ultimately about safety; it was about perceived safety and special protection
given to certain industry players by the government. 7 This is generally the
thrust of the motivation for any regulation that benefits one party at the
expense of others, and it is almost always presented politically as for the
benefit of the community at large.8 8
4. Regulating Towards the Consolidation of Farms
Apart from the coercive or manipulative hand of government intervention,
consolidation and expansion are not inherently bad. 9 The direct regulation

79. Lawrence W. Reed, Ideas and Consequences: Of Meat and Myth, FREEMAN (Nov. 1,
1994), http://www.fee.org/the-freeman/detail/ideas-and-consequences-of-meat- andmyth#axzz211LOji5v.
80. LUSK, supra note 78, at 49.
81. Id.; see EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 57-58.
82. Id. at 58.
83. Id.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 57-59.
86. Id.

87. See Reed, supra note 79.
88. EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 194.
89. MisEs, supra note 53, at 239.
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through the Meat Inspection Act coincided with a legislative policy that
continually encouraged the consolidation of food production in American
agriculture. 90 Congressional policy pushed for a consolidation of farmland
with a mentality of "[g]et big or get out."9' Congress did this by incentivizing
specific commodity crops, with subsidies structured to scale the reward with
increased production, thus favoring large monocultures. 92 In the 1980s, there
was further consolidation of farmland following a financial crisis in the field of
agriculture as farmers became heavily indebted. 93 The definition of family
farm changed with this consolidation, and thus, while families still own
American farms, the farms have become much larger, mechanized, less
diversified, and more capital intensive than ever.94 It is important to note that
legislative policy continued to encourage this consolidation and
industrialization of agricultural operations in response to this specific financial
crisis. The country laments the loss of small business, while the interventionist
policies in place artificially fuel the normal market forces that lead to this on a
smaller scale. 95
5. Regulation of Biotechnology
The complexities of issues surrounding genetically modified food
production is beyond the scope of this Comment, but it is important to note
a few key details about regulation of biotechnology in America.
Biotechnology allows scientists to modify the genetic makeup of various
plants and animals. 96 This is most frequently used in agriculture to make a
plant resistant to a particular pesticide, or to enable the plant itself to
produce pesticides. 97 The general regulatory policy in America is that the
biotechnology process itself is not inherently dangerous or risky.9 Thus, the
United States Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Food and Drug Administration regulate biotechnology in
fragments. 99 In a paradigm of pervasive and expansive regulations and
barriers on most aspects of the food supply, it is somewhat surprising to see
90. Schneider, supra note 16, at 943.
91. BERRY, supra note 6, at 41.
92. Schneider, supra note 16, at 943.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. MISES, supra note 53, at 238-39.
96. Claire Althouse, "Farming Out" Regulatory Responsibility: Private Parties in the
Biotechnology Age, 23 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 421,421-22 (2011).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 423.
99. Id.
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relatively little regulation or caution over biotechnology applied to food
production.' ° The most common complaint is that biotechnology
companies do not have to "prove the new products won't cause illness," but
there is a maxim in logic that one cannot prove a negative.'0 '
D. Liberty Interest in Food Choice
"Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little
temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."' 2 Perhaps this
quotation from Benjamin Franklin has become trite over the years. It is
often thrown around without much thought at any government programspecifically after the events on September 11, 2001.103 But what is the heart
of Franklin's message? What is essential liberty? What qualifies as
temporary safety?
1. Fundamental Rights Acknowledged Today
A fundamental right is one that is deemed so important that the
government cannot infringe upon it without clearly proving that it is
necessary to do so.'0 4 Within the framework of modern constitutional
jurisprudence, a primary avenue through which food choice could be
viewed as a fundamental right is under the liberty right of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' Perhaps most similar to the issue at hand are the implied

100. LUSK, supra note 78, at 105. The biggest inconsistency between the regulatory policy
of biotechnology and other foods and products is the minimal barriers to entry or testing
requirements of biotechnology food; and, most notably, the lack of any label requirement
stating there has been genetic modification, which implicates potential claims of
misbranding or adulteration. Karen Charman, Genetically Modified Food Has Great
Potentialfor Harm, in FOOD SAFETY 41, 44, 50 (Stuart A. Kallen ed., 2005).
101. LUSK, supra note 78, at 106; Charman, supra note 100, at 41 (arguing that genetically
engineered foods have been rushed to market and have not been proven safe).
102. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, PENNSYLVANIA ASSEMBLY: REPLY TO THE GOVERNOR (Nov. 11,
1755), reprinted in THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 238, 242 (Leonard W. Labaree et al.

eds., 1963).
103. See e.g., Ben Theobald, After 9/11: Sacrificing Liberty for Security, IOWA ST. DAILY
(Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.iowastatedaily.com/911/article_9le8flfO-da3l-1leO-9e25001cc4c002e0.html; Michael Lofti, 9/11-The Funeral For Freedom, BEN SWANN (Sept. 11,
2013), http://benswann.com/9 1-the- funeral- for-freedom/.
104. Kammi L. Rencher, Food Choice and Fundamental Rights: A Piece of Cake or Pie in
the Sky?, 12 NEV. L.J. 418, 423 (2012).
105. Id. at 424.
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fundamental rights recognized by the Court to be free of state interference
in personal choices concerning health and medical care." 6
Implied rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are derived using three
tests that reason from a general right of liberty to the particulars of what the
liberty right looks like when applied. The first test asks whether a right 0in°7
question is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."
This same test was later expressed by the Supreme Court as a right that is a
"vital personal right[] essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."' ' The second test asks whether the right at stake is "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'0 9
The third and final test asks whether government invasion of a personal
liberty is "so outrageous that it shocks the conscience."" 0
Using these and other tests, the Court has firmly established a "historical
recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.""' It
is important to know what iights the Court has seen as fundamental over
the years, because this precedent will be used for any analogous right
analysis. The Court has recognized as fundamental the right to control the
upbringing of one's own children, " 2 the right to marry regardless of race,"'
the right to custody of children,' the right to procreate,"' and the right to
keep the family together." 6
Without detailing every step along the fundamental right progression, it
is sufficient to know that the Court takes into consideration any number of
the following factors when recognizing certain rights as fundamental: (1)
the importance of the disputed right; (2) the right is implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty or is implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution; (3) the
right is deeply rooted in the history and tradition of the Nation; (4) the right
is in need of special protection because government action shocks the
106. Id. at 425. Rencher provides a more in depth look at the issue of how the right of
food choice would likely be handled by the Supreme Court. See e.g., id. at 423-42.
107. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942).
108. Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
109. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
110. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Rencher, supra note 104, at 424.
111. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing court cases that recognize
the right).
112. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
113. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
114. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
115. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
116. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977).
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conscience; (5) the right is a necessary implication of the structure of the
government or Constitution; (6) the right provides necessary access to
government processes; and (7) the right has been identified by previous
17
Supreme Court decisions.
2.

Fundamental Right Test Applied to Food Choice

As stated above, the most analogous fundamental right analysis for a
discussion on food choice is the recognition by the Court of a fundamental
right to be free from state interference in personal choices concerning health
and medical care."' But there are other facets of the fundamental right analysis
that can be discussed as it relates to food choice. Food choice encompasses
aspects of personal identity. Certainly food choice has a direct impact on a
person's health, but food also goes deeper than just sustenance; it is often a
form of expression-sometimes implicating religious expression.
3.

Liberty of Contract
a.

Contract Clause

Long before the Fourteenth Amendment came the Contract Clause,119

and before the Contract Clause was man's right to contract. 2 ° Man's right
to contract is a natural right recognized in-not created by-the United
States Constitution. 2 ' The reality and awareness of natural law was
pervasive during the period of America's founding.'22 It was expressed in
the Declaration of Independence's proclamation of "self-evident truths,"
human equality, the necessity of having the consent of the governed, and
even the right to revolution when justified.'23 What is meant by these truths
117. Robert C. Farrell, An Excess of Methods: Identifying Implied FundamentalRights in
the Supreme Court, 26 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 203, 216 (2007).

118. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that prisoners could not be
forced to take antipsychotic drugs); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.

120. Hadley Arkes, The Shadow of Natural Rights, or A Guide from the Perplexed, 86
MICH. L. REv. 1492, 1512 (1988) [hereinafter Shadow].
121. Id.-The Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not create nor establish a right
to contract; the language of this clause assumes this inherent right and prohibits the States
from infringing upon it, just as it does for the rights contained in the Bill of Rights and
elsewhere in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, §
10, cl. 1 ("No State shall .. , pass any.. . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.").
122. HADLEY ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS AND
TOUCHSTONE OF THE NATURAL LAW 61 (2010).

ANCHORING

TRUTHS:

THE

123. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). While it is true that the
American Founders were unable, as a whole, to remedy the violation of natural law in their
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being self-evident is not that everyone knows them, but that they are true
regardless of their being known to all.14 Natural law principles stand as the
foundation of the structure of the U.S. Constitution that followed, though it
is not as overtly apparent in the text of the Constitution itself. More than
that, "natural law is bound up with the laws of reason, or the canons of
logic."' 25 Thus, in reality, natural law is unavoidable.'26 "Judges are 'doing'
time on the issue of slavery, they declared a truth of "a law that runs counter to [their] own
inclinations or interests" in the founding words that "all men are created equal." ARKES,
supra note 122, at 56. Regarding the principle that "all men are created equal," Arkes says:
The political Left in our own day reproaches the American Founders for their
putative failure to respect that principle. In that argument, the Founders have
been indicted for the accommodations they made with the evil of slavery. But as
we have seen, the embarrassment for writers on the Left is that they deny that
there is a "nature" that provides the ground for these claims of equality and
rights. They take a moral high ground in relation to the Founders, and yet they
deny that there are moral truths that reason can know. And so, while they

elevate "equality" as a principle, they deny that principle, or any other moral
principle, the standing of a truth.

Id.
124. ARKES, supra note 122, at 56; see 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA bk. I,
question 96, art. 5, pt. II (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian
Classics 1981) (c. 1265) ("The Apostle says: Let every soul be subject to the higherpowers. But
subjection to a power seems to imply subjection to the laws framed by that power.") (internal
citation omitted); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 31 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton discusses
the nature of eternal truths:
In disquisitions of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first
principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain
an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or combination,
commands the assent of the mind. . . . Of this nature are the maxims in
geometry that "the whole is greater than its part; things equal to the same are
equal to one another; two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right
angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other maxims in
ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the
means ought to be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be
commensurate with its object; that there ought to be no limitation of a power
destined to effect a purposewhich is itself incapable of limitation.
Id. This line of reasoning is not based on experience, which could only conclude that "Most
men are created equal, most of the time," but rather as a necessary proposition, since we have
no experience of the future. ARKES, supra note 122, at 57-58. These necessary propositions
are first principles from which we draw judgments in the law and in life. Id. at 59.
125. ARKES, supra note 122, at 60.
126. Id. at 24.
John Locke suggested this chain of reasoning: We might say that the legislature
is the source of the positive law, the law that is posited or enacted. But then
what is the source of the legislature, or the authority to legislate? In our own
country, the Constitution would establish that we have a legislature, of two
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natural law when they simply appeal, as Blackstone said, to the 'law of
nature and reason." 27 It is within this natural law framework that Chief
Justice John Marshall referred to the Contract Clause as "a bill of rights for
the people of each state."' 28 Natural law is scoffed at by legal scholars of our
day, and the trend away from natural law reasoning and assumptions began
long ago. But man cannot function apart from relying on immutable
presuppositional truths as the foundation of logic and reason, whether he
acknowledges it or not.'29 Sadly, the Contract Clause was essentially
rendered invalid in the 1934 Supreme Court decision of Home Building &
Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell.3 "In this manner did Chief Justice Hughes make a

houses, with the authority to enact laws. The source of the legislature then
would be in the positive law of the Constitution, the Constitution that was
drafted and ratified in a vote by the people. But then what was the ground of
that original right, exercised by the people, to enact a Constitution? As Locke
put it in his Second Treatise, "the constitution of the legislative being the
original and supreme act of the society," it had to be "antecedent to all positive
laws." The power to make the positive law is defined by the Constitution, but
the Constitution itself cannot spring then from the positive law. It had to find
its origins, as Locke said, in that understanding "antecedent to all positive
laws," and that authority was "depending wholly on the people," on their
natural right to be governed with their own consent.
Id. This proposes that natural law is not merely inductive. Id.
127. Id. at 25.
128. Paul
Moreno,
The
U.S.
Supreme
Court
and Natural Law,
http://www.nlnrac.org/american/u.s.-supreme-court. Like the other Bill of Rights, this
implies the pre-existing nature of the right. The American Founders were hesitant to include
the Bill of Rights provisions in the Constitution because they saw them as unnecessary in the
system of enumerated powers that the Constitution established. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 6-7 (1957). In fact, the Bill of Rights was seen as
potentially dangerous in giving people the impression that their rights were limited by those
expressed in the Bill of Rights, or implying that the federal government was given any power
to restrict the rights listed. Id. at 7. Alexander Hamilton addressed his concerns, saying,
For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?
Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be
restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?...
This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which would be given to
the doctrine of constructive power, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for
bills of rights.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). The point Marshall is making is significant
because the Contract Clause is distinct from the Bill of Rights in that it is a specific
restriction on the states, much like the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
129. ARKES, supra note 122, at 24.
130. See Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 416, 443 (1934); ARKES,
supra note 122, at 15.
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nullity of the Contracts Clause through 'adaptation,"''" as Chief Justice
Marshall warned in Ogden v. Saunders.'32
b. Liberty of contract as economic substantive due process
Today, any notion of Liberty of Contract brings to mind the case of
Lochner v. New York. 33 The freedom to contract was viewed in this case as
protected under what has become known as the economic branch of the
substantive due process clause.' 34 This idea of substantive due process really
amounts to natural law, as the specific applications are merely drawn from
the rights to life, liberty, and property. The judges during the time of
Lochner saw this natural right to contract as originating outside of positive
law. 3' Yet, this liberty, as with most, was rightly seen as subject to
limitations that can be placed upon it based on other natural laws of
morality, as established and enforced by the police powers vested in a state.
In Lochner, the problem did not arise from an intent to restrict liberty in
furtherance of a legitimate police power, but rather, the purported police
power being enacted was seen as a pretense.'36 The factual circumstances

131.

ARKES, supra note 122, at 15.

132. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827). Allowing the government to change the
obligation of contracts after it had been established would "make a nullity of the very notion
of an 'obligation of contract.' "ARKES, supra note 122, at 16.
133. ARKES, supra note 122, at 86; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
134. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 60-62 (discussing the undue interference with the liberty of
contract).
135. Id. at 60-61. The legislation that restricted the hours an employee could work at a
bakery was certainly not explicitly addressed in the Constitution, and therefore the natural
right found by the judges in Lochner was a particular application of "liberty" reasoned by

way of natural law to apply in this case, viewed within the constraints placed upon this
liberty under natural law. Constitutional professor and Dean, Jeffrey Tuomala, identifies the
view of common law as necessarily being identified with God's law, or natural law. Jeffrey C.
Tuomala, Marbury v. Madison and the Foundationof Law, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REv. 297, 319
(2010). Dean Tuomala explains,
The problem of defining the concept of general principles of law is intertwined
with the problem of defining "common law." Today, common law has no
generally accepted meaning, though it is often referred to as judge-made law.
This assertion is made despite the fact that Article I of the U.S. Constitution
and probably all state constitutions vest the power to make law in a legislative.
body separate from the courts. The judge-made view of law, unless it recognizes
a preexisting law, is a form of legal positivism-that law is simply the command
of the sovereign.
Id. at 316-17.
136. ARKEs, supra note 122, at 93, 100. The Lochner Court struck down the State statute
as unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, declaring
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leading up to this case certainly imply the kind of rent-seeking activities
described above. 3 7 The first call for the regulation came from a meeting of
bakers and members of the bakers' union; and the effect of the law once passed
was primarily to reduce the number of small bakeries, advancing a
concentration of the baking companies.'38 "Regulations of business, then,
raised no moral strains for the judges. But the jurists also had the wit to
recognize those gradations by which a law advertised as a regulation of
business turned itself into something else."' 39 Thus, the Lochner decision was
not a reactionary laissez-faire decision to guard businesses against regulation
at all costs.' Even so, the judges "saw nothing denigrating in the notion that
they were defending in these cases rights of property, for those rights were
indeed natural rights, or human rights."' 4 ' It was believed that the "right to
make a living at an ordinary calling, to enter a legitimate occupation, without
arbitrary restrictions, was a right that ran as deep as the right to speak or
publish."'42 At the heart of the Lochner decision is a sense that people merit "a
presumption of their competence to govern their own lives; that they would
not find in our patronizing tenderness the main security for their well-being;
and they surely would not find there the source of their rights."'43
E. Liberty Interests Versus Safety Interests in the Case of Raw Milk
One of the best modern examples of this tension between liberty interests
in food choice, set out above, and State regulation is the battle over raw milk
consumption and the State's aggressive tactics to take down this heavy
consumer-driven industry.' The FDA and CDC have long lambasted raw
that there was "no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a
health law to safeguard the public health, or the health of the individuals who are following
the trade of a baker." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58.
137. ARKES, supra note 122, at 101; see supra Part II.C.1.
138. Id. at 101; Shadow, supra note 120, at 1510.
139. ARKES, supra note 122, at 93.

140. Id. at 94.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 106.
144. A prime example of this occurred in 2011, when a year-long FBI sting operation
culminated in an armed multi-agency raid on an Amish farm that had been selling raw milk to
local customers. See Baylen J.Linnekin, Mopping Up the Raw-Milk Mob, WASH. TIMES (May 13,
2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/13/mopping-up-the-raw-milk-mob
/?page=all#pagebreak. But this was no isolated incident. Raids on small farms and community
food co-ops have been on the rise, both at the state and federal level. See RaidsAgainst America's
Small Farms, FARM FOOD FREEDOM COALITION, http://farmfoodfreedom.org/section/raids-
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milk consumption as extremely dangerous, the FDA going so far as to
equate it with "playing Russian roulette with your health." 4 ' But there are
experts who claim that raw milk has many health benefits that are destroyed
with pasteurization.'46
It is not really disputed that milk-related illnesses did arise at one point
in history, but it was actually due to unsafe farming practices in dirty cities
and not a factor of any inherent danger in raw milk. 4 7 Raw milk
consumption was not problematic before the industrial revolution, and it
would not be problematic once refrigeration allowed for dairies to be
removed from city limits. 48 It was simply a "blip on the screen of human
history." 49 During the early 1900s, as cities grew in size, dairy farms sprang
up within the city limits, fueled by the byproduct of the breweries, called
distiller's grain.' This feed altered the pH balance of the cows' rumen and
led to sickness among the dairies.' The sickness of the cows combined
with a confluence of factors, including cities and streets overrun with
manure, disease, and a general lack of human hygiene, to create a pathogenrich environment that was a major threat to the health of the city
dwellers. 2 The result was an unprecedented pathogen proliferation, and
the accepted solution was to impose pasteurization, rather than addressing
5 3
the source of the contamination.
Many individuals claim experiencing healing of chronic illness
accomplished, at least in part, by the consumption of raw milk, and many
people that are unable to digest pasteurized milk without experiencing
allergic reactions are able to digest raw milk with ease.5 4 The bacteria that is
naturally occurring in raw milk, combined with the enzymes that aid in
digestion, are actually one of the primary things that make it desirable by
many, as the bacteria is understood to be a probiotic, or helpful bacteria,

against-americas-small-farms (last visited Feb. 6, 2015); Erik Kain, Police Raid Rawesome Foods,
Dump Raw Milk, FORBES.COM (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/08/
03/swat-team-raids-raw-milk-farm-rawesome-arrests-owner/.
145. Rencher, supra note 104, at 421.
146. Id.
147. JOEL SALATIN, EVERYTHING I WANT TO DO ISILLEGAL 15-16 (2007).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 15.
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. Id. at 15-16.
153. Id.

154. Rencher, supranote 104, at 422.
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and the lactic acid is viewed as a natural preservative. 5 Raw milk advocates
rightly highlight the fact that pasteurized milk may still contain the
pathogens that raw milk is decried to harbor.'56 The FDA refuses to even
debate the safety of raw milk, clinging to skewed statistics that, viewed in
the worst light possible for raw milk, only show how insignificant a health
threat raw milk consumption really is in the large picture of the estimated
76 million people who are sickened by food each year.'
In a strange perversion of events, the very consumers the FDA was
purportedly established to protect became the targets of the FDA's scorn
and persecution. Those farmers seeking to provide what they see as a higher
quality product to that of the pasteurized alternative to these consumers
who desire it are shut down without any adulteration being shown. The
CDC at least concedes that the pasteurization process degrades some
vitamins that are naturally occurring in raw milk-as is the case with most
foods that are heated. 5 Proponents of raw milk often cite a 2005 European
study and general statistics of the Amish which seem to indicate that
consumption of raw milk offers protection from asthma and allergies, but
there are certainly more variables between the eating and lifestyle habits of
these two study groups than just raw milk consumptions.'5 9
The purpose of this discussion is to show that there are studies that claim
to support both sides of the argument. One's conclusion about the safety of
raw milk-and of the many food choices and preparation methods-really
hinges on whose opinion one chooses to agree with, as a matter of
discretion and wisdom. With this backdrop, a few specific problems can be
addressed as it pertains to food safety regulation.
III. PROBLEM
A. The Shifting Sands of Safety: Safe Today, Poisonous Tomorrow
One does not need to live a century to see the often subjective, and often
wrong, conclusions of scientists and experts when it comes to the health
and safety of various foods and products that affect food. 6 Perhaps there is
155. Donna M. Byrne, Raw Milk in Context, 26 J. ENVTL. L. &LITIG. 109, 116 (2011).

156. Id. at 112-14.
157. Rencher, supra note 104, at 422.
158. Byrne, supra note 155, at 115.
159. Id. at 116.

160. I am reminded of the poor, incredible, edible egg, which has fallen in and out of
favor over the years. See John Berardi, Eggs: Healthy or Not?, HUFFINGTON POST (July 16,

2013), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/john-berardi-phd/egss-and-health-b-3499583.html?;
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more subjectivity in the debate over the healthfulness of different foods, but
there is still plenty of disagreement over the safety of various products and
methods, such as foods grown with pesticides, genetically modified
organisms, growth hormones, chemical ripening, antibiotics in meat
animals, and many more. 6 ' Given the difficulty to come to objective
conclusions, and the various interests involved, some believe food .safety
regulation to be as much a matter of politics as it is of science.162
B. Legitimate State Interest in Regulation
1. Regulating to Protect From the Known and Desired?
a.

The legitimate scope of state safety regulation

The primary purported intent of all early regulation was to protect the
consumer from unknown, or misrepresented, adulterated products; yet the
modern paradigm seeks to purport legitimacy in prohibiting products of
which the regulators do not really know better than the informed consumer
who desires a certain product. 6 At the state level, aside from adulteration
and misrepresentation, the determination of the safety or health of a
particular food item is largely subjective-as are the methods for achieving
safety in production and processing."
b. The illegitimate reach of state safety regulation
If the goal of food safety regulation is to protect the consumer from what
he does not know, a paternalistic-looking regulation that disregards the
consumer's knowledge and desire cannot really be seen as for safety or
protection of anything other than the corporate interest that has market
Eating Egg Yolks as 'Bad as Smoking,' NHS CHOICES (Aug. 15, 2012),
http://www.nhs.uk/news/2012/
08august/Pages/Eating-egg-yolks-as-bad-as-smoking.aspx;
see also JOEL SALATIN, FOLKS, THIS AIN'T NORMAL: A FARMER'S ADVICE FOR HAPPIER HENS,
HEALTHIER PEOPLE, AND A BETTER WORLD 301 (2011). Referring to a discussion on
sterilization not being optimum for health, Salatin says, "Food safety is completely
subjective. I don't think for a minute that most of what's in the supermarket is safe. But it's
been deemed safe because it only kills you slowly." Id. Salatin argues that the primary factor
that regulatory agencies look at in food safety is only what would be a lethal single dose. Id.
He calls the idea that what doesn't kill you right now is safe nonsense. Id. See also JAMES T.
O'REILLY, A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO FOOD REGULATION AND SAFETY 2 (2010).
161.

Rencher, supranote 104, at 421.

162. Id.

163. See supra Part II.C.2; Part III.A. This is true mostly in dealing with cottage industry
products from local farms or markets.
164. Rencher, supra note 104, at 421.
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share at stake.'65 At what point does the interest of the State to help promote
the safety of the people become illegitimate? Is the FDA meant to function
as a parent and protect the people from making their own fully informed
decisions?' 6 The nature of some regulations drift so far away from the
problems for which the regulations spawned that it becomes clear that
ulterior motives are at play.'67 Issues like raw-milk consumption and onfarm meat processing, taken as a whole, do not fall within any framework of
adulteration or protection from an unknown threat or danger. 6 To seek to
ban entire industries over a difference in opinion becomes not a policy of
safety, but of economic protection for certain other industries.'69
A prime example of the attitude of regulatory agencies towards citizens is
found in the official response of the Virginia Department of Agriculture
and Consumer Services to citizens' resistance to increased regulations
governing raw milk and the production of cheeses from raw milk. 7 ° The
Agency responded to citizen comments advocating the view that it should
be a matter of choice for people to decide what to eat by stating, "For
individuals to make a choice implies that they have some basic knowledge
on which to base a decision. The Department believes that the average
consumer does not possess the basic knowledge to be able to determine if
milk and dairy products are safe."'' There is a discomforting problem with
165. SALATIN, supra note 147, at 62.

166. As discussed in Part II, the origin of the FDA's charge was to combat adulteration
and deception of the public. See supra Part I1.C.2. This line is crossed when regulation
crosses into overriding informed decisions of things that are not inherently dangerous by
their very nature. As Mr. Lusk eloquently puts it:
So, if we're not responsible for ourselves, who is? And who is responsible for
the people who think they're responsible for us? The elite's motive for denying
personal responsibility is self-evident. As Thomas Sowell put it, "To believe in
personal responsibility would be to destroy the whole special role of the
anointed, whose vision casts them in the role of rescuers of people treated
unfairly by 'society."'
LUSK, supra note 78, at 145.

167. See SALATIN, supra note 147, at 62. Salatin argues that prohibiting only the sale of
such goods identifies the regulation of the sale as a pretext for achieving a safety regulation.
Id.
168. These products are not really seen as inherently dangerous, such as drugs (which are
banned even for possession) as there is no prohibition from possessing, consuming, or giving
raw milk away, or any other prohibited home-grown foods, such as vegetables, or homeprocessed meat; the prohibition is only in the selling of these goods. Id. at 61-62.
169. Id. at 62.
170. Final Regulation Agency Background Document, supra note 11.
171. Id. at 13. The Department goes on to say that consumers assume the products being
offered for sale are safe based off experience, not knowledge of actual safety. Id. The
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this view of consumers. In the eyes of the regulatory agencies, the
"consumer is too pitifully ignorant to make her own decisions." 712
No
amount of research, knowledge, or disagreement will help a consumer
escape the limitations placed upon her by this paternalistic paradigm. The
regulatory agency allows questions and statements to be offered here, as
they do with many proposed regulations, but it seems more like a formality
173
since it summarily dismisses all opposing statements or questions.
2.

The Faulty Focus of Food Regulation

One major criticism of the current regulatory approach by the FDA and
USDA is that it focuses on infrastructure, rather than results.'74 As farmer
and author Joel Salatin says,
The problem is that the rules become requirements of system
rather than requirements of competency. If a touchdown is the
goal, you can have just as valid a touchdown on a short field as a
long one. If food safety is the goal, you can have just as safe a
food produced in a home kitchen as in a Campbell's soup
factory. If the goal is safe food, who cares what the infrastructure
175
is as long as the food is safe?
The common regulatory response is that the agency must provide an even
playing field, but this is a fallacy, as the safety concerns and infrastructure
requirements are just not equal among operations of different sizes.'76 The
people being contaminated with food-borne bacteria are not getting it from
small-scale facilities-"they are getting it from the industrial-sized closeddoor federal facilities where the government-corporate fraternity speaks the
same language and colludes to make sure that whatever truly innovative

Department also declares that consumers "lack basic understanding of risk factors involved
with sanitation, production and processing methods, packaging, handling, labeling, and
distribution." Id.
172. SALATIN, supra note 147, at 75. Understandably, Salatin views this statement as
extremely condescending and identifies much hypocrisy in the other portions of the
statement. Id.
173. See generally Final Regulation Agency Background Document, supra note 11. The

agency generally responds to any contrary public comment by simply saying it disagrees and
offering some further comment, but no challenge or comment had any impact on the
outcome. Id. at 10-17.
174. SALATIN, supra note 147, at 69.
175. Id. at 73.
176. Id. at 72.
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answers exist to today's problems will never see the light of day."177 Salatin
sums up the problem perfectly: "These ludicrous requirements are an
attempt to legislate integrity, and integrity cannot be legislated."17
Not only does increased infrastructure not guarantee food safety, it
imposes significant barriers of entry to upstart entrepreneurs and slowly
works towards shutting out competitive forces in the marketplace,
enshrining the status quo of the day and protecting the businesses that are
already established.'79
One cannot sell milk from a few cows anymore; the law-required
equipment is too expensive. Those markets were done away with
in the name of sanitation-but, of course, to the enrichment of
the large producers. We have always had to have "a good reason"
for doing away with small operators, and in modern times the
good reason has often been sanitation, for which there is
apparently no small or cheap technology.'
This focus on infrastructure has created an accelerated consolidation in the
food production market.' In light of new regulations and infrastructure
requirements, businesses constantly seek expansion in order to spread out
the cost of regulations. 2 This consolidation creates a problem, when
encouraged and protected by legislation, as it becomes totalitarian; it
"establishes an inevitable tendency toward the one that will be the biggest of
all." '3 "It is now, for the first time, deemed provident and wise to put all the
eggs in one basket."' Thus, the focus on infrastructure creates an undue
burden in cost to future entrepreneurial activity, but this is only one piece
of the cost puzzle imposed by regulation.
C. The Costs of Regulation
All forms of regulation impose various costs on the economy, and the
costs are not limited to monetary costs.'85 Most obvious and quantifiable is
the budgetary cost of regulation-the money taken by taxes from the
177. Id.at 62.
178. Id. at 73.
179.

BERRY,

supra note 6,at 41; see also SALATIN, supra note 147, at 62.

180. BERRY, supra note 6, at 41.
181.

Id.

182. SALATIN, supra note 147, at 74.
183. BERRY, supra note 6, at 41.
184. Id. at 36.
185. EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 166.

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:373

private sector-reducing what would otherwise be employed for production
or consumption." 6 The budgetary cost of regulation is staggering, and ever
on the rise, with the projected budget of $59.4 billion for the development
and enforcement of federal regulations sought for 2014.187 This regulatory
budget has nearly doubled every ten years since 1980, when the budget was
$7.3 billion.' 8 But these soaring budgetary costs pale in comparison to the
non-budgetary costs of regulation, which ultimately fall on private
producers and consumers." 9 The non-budgetary costs of regulation were
most completely and accurately measured by Thomas Hopkins of the
Rochester Institute of Technology, who had been tracking this information
from 1977 to the publication of his research in 1996.19 As of 1996, Hopkins
and his team estimated an annual compliance cost of $668 billion imposed
on the private sector.' 9'
Even these two main prongs of the cost of regulation do not give the
whole cost picture. One of the main intangible costs is the barrier to entry
that such regulations play on would-be participants in the market. With
respect to infrastructure requirements placed on the food processing
industry, Salatin rightly concludes that the practical effect of these
regulations is to ensure that "whatever money is made in tomorrow's food
system, will be made by today's players. Upstarts are not allowed."' 92 This
cost in the barrier to innovation and entrepreneurship is significant, even
though it is not easily quantified.
D. Regulatory Capture
The analysis of certain regulatory measures being only a pretext of
achieving some legitimate object of safety implies the problem of "regulatory
failure," as contrasted with "market failure." Regulatory failure is caused by an

186. Id.

187. Susan Dudley & Melinda Warren, Sequester's Impact on Regulatory Agencies Modest,
STUDIES
CENTER
1 (July 2013), http://wc.wustl.edu/files/wc/imce
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/2014_regulatorsjbudgetO.pdf.
188. Id. at title page.
189. EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 171.
190. Id.
191. THOMAS

D. HOPKINS, CENTER FOR STUDY

OF AM.

Bus.,

REGULATORY COSTS IN PROFILE

1 (Aug. 1996), http://wc.wustl.edu/files/wc/imce/regulatory-costs-in-profile.pdf. With the
increase in budgetary costs since this report was published, we can imagine a similar upward
trend in this non-budgetary figure, as the regulatory requirements continue to increase and
impose additional costs in the market.
192. SALATIN, supranote 147, at 62.
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effective capture of the regulatory agencies by the regulated industries.'9 3 Many
political scientists and economists have identified this problem since the rise of
the regulatory state in America 4 Economists developed the idea of regulatory
capture into an economic theory of regulation.'95 Under this theory, regulation
can be viewed as a commodity that is essentially available in the political
marketplace. 9 6 Thus, politicians and bureaucrats supply regulation "by
reference to the demand of those who would benefit from its promulgation,
the price being some form of political, generally electoral, support."'9 7 The
problem with regulation is that after the initial public outcry leads to particular
regulatory measures being passed, the continual coordinated influence is most
effectively sustained by the regulated industry that is most connected and
involved with the ongoing regulation. 9 ' Thus, producers, rather than
consumers will most often secure the "commodity" of regulation over time. 99
The problem of regulatory capture becomes even more problematic in
combination with policies that artificially fuel consolidation of industry,
leading to a more uniform power base from which to secure the "commodity"
of regulation in any specific industry.
IV. PROPOSAL

It has been necessary to look at regulation in a broad, philosophical view
for this Comment. Specific applications and discussions of food-safety
regulation, and the impact of any potential changes, need to be addressed
individually and thoroughly. With a fresh awareness of the dangers
involved in combining the power of the state with the interests of political
rent-seeking behavior, it is necessary to carefully discern when state action
is outside of any plausible police power authority. This proposal will
advocate a change in the paradigm through which we view food-safety
regulation and will recommend specific steps towards achieving such
change. The first and foundational change that must take place is one of
perspective, with a refocus on a proper view of personal responsibility in
decision making about one's health and purchase decisions. The second
change is to remove infrastructure as a requirement for safety. The third
193. ANTHONY OGUS, Economics and the Design of Regulatory Law, in THE LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FREE MARKETS 104, 108 (Stephen F. Copp ed., 2008).
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proposed change is to allow individuals to opt-out of the purported
protections of various regulatory requirements placed on producers,
allowing the individual and the producer to assume responsibility of the
integrity of the food exchanged.
A. Removing the PaternalisticPerspective
"Assuming the right to care for someone when they haven't asked for it is
only slightly shy of tyranny."2"' We live in a time when people are less likely
to take responsibility for the decisions that they make. It is a paradigm that
grows stronger each day, as the more we outsource our responsibility, or the
more someone else assumes it on our behalf, the more we begin to lose our
sense of being personally responsible for our decisions. "The champions of
freedom can win only if they are supported by a citizenry fully and
unconditionally committed to the ideal of freedom."2"' Regulators and
legislators seeking to impose their opinions on others do so, in part, by
"exaggerating the importance of low-probability risks."20 2
Thus, the first necessary step is to reject the idea of the paternalistic state
and to recognize that regulation is inherently medieval and dictatorial.2 3
Ownership and responsibility of any property or idea will always yield a
more careful treatment with rational self-interested people, and a lack of
responsibility inevitably moves people towards ignorance and
complacency." 4 The government cannot respond as necessary to change to
the ever-accelerating pace of innovation. "Government bureaucracy lacks
this key dynamism embedded in the market."2 ' "There is a viable
alternative to paternalism. It is what it always has been-the market."2 6

200. LUSK, supra note 78, at 69.
201. MISES, supra note 53, at 201.
202. LUSK, supra note 78, at 70.
203. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 226.
204. SALATIN, supra note 160, at 313. Salatin states, "Every time the government takes
away decision-making power and choice risks, it dumbs down the populace in that arena."
Id. at 314.
205. LUSK, supra note 78, at 79 (referring to the dynamics of market induced changes that
occur frequently based on the changing needs/wants/desires of the customer).
206. Id. at 80; Robert Sugden, Why Incoherent PreferencesDo Not Justify Paternalism,19
CONST. POL. ECON. 226, 247 (2008).
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B. Specific Steps in Food Safety Regulation
Without some systematic crises, incremental steps are likely to be the
only realistic way forward.2" 7 This proposal offers three specific steps
towards a proper view of government oversight and requirements in the
area of food safety.
1. A Shift Away from Requirements of Infrastructure
It is tempting-and quite fashionable-to invoke what looks like a
patriotic call for government intervention to help the quintessential,
independent small farmer.08 It is undisputed that regulatory requirements
affect smaller enterprises more dramatically, largely due to their inability to
spread the cost. But we have seen the pernicious effect that government
intervention has had on agriculture, and we still live with it today. In any
market, it is good for inefficient businesses to go out of business-no matter
their size-and in a free market, efficient small businesses are almost sure to
grow and cease to be small. 0 9 But if the "government grants privileges to
certain categories of small business, it must neatly circumscribe the
conditions that entitle a man to claim these privileges and must enforce
these regulations," and so the privilege becomes a regulation in disguise.1 0
Thus, the focus of our action must be on removing arbitrary barriers to
growth that were implemented in the name of safety, and not on artificially
propping up what does not work. The law must view food safety
enforcement in terms of the objective safety of the output, and not the
expanse of the means used to get to that output. Infrastructure is simply not
the problem in food safety, and infrastructure will naturally grow to meet a
business's needs as it grows. It seems as if the current food safety law looks
to the infrastructure in place at the biggest and most technologically
advanced enterprise, and establishes that as the standard for all. But this
one-size-fits-all infrastructure requirement will achieve neither safety nor
innovation.2 ' Purported safety policies that insulate a business of any size
from competitive forces must be abandoned.2" ' At the very least, food safety
regulations must be reformed to remove arbitrary and expensive
207. EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 224-25.
208. MISES, supra note 53, at 236-37.
209. Id. at 239.
210. Id. at 237. This concept is illustrated in the case of the recent Food Safety
Modernization Act and the exemption for small enterprises contained therein. See supra text
accompanying note 65.
211. SALATIN, supra note 147, at 61-62.
212. Id. at 62.

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:373

infrastructure requirements from artificially blocking business startup,
development, and innovation.
2.

Opting-out of Government Food Choice Responsibility: Informed
Consent for the Consumer

Looking at the foundational purported purpose and intent of food safety
regulation as being to address the issue of adulterated and misbranded
products-both of which require a deceived or unknowing consumer-safety
regulation must not be able to trump the willingness of parties to enter into a
contract for the sale of food. There are no moral limitations on the liberty of
contract implicated in this situation. Thus, regulatory law needs to be changed
to remove restrictions on a consumer's ability to purchase any food product,
assurming both buyer and seller opt-out of regulatory oversight or assurance of
the safety of the product. This can be easily affected by the creation of buying
clubs or organizations that consumers and producers can become members of,
whereby sufficient education on safety risks can be required, and the optingout can be fully informed.
It is critical to remember that producers of any product have incentives
to test their products for safety and effectiveness before marketing them,
and have in fact always tested their products as allowed by the technology of
the time.213 The primary incentive is always the competition of other players
in the marketplace; specifically, the threatened or actual loss of customers
who quickly change what products they purchase and from whom they are
purchased in response to concerns.214 Similarly, consumers certainly have
an incentive to verify the safety of the source of the food they acquire, and
consumers will be much more inclined to do this without the often-false
sense of security that comes with regulation. Consumers are not helpless to
address problems without our current paternalistic regulatory perspective.
If producers are not sufficiently motivated by market incentives and
competition, they are subject to criminal and civil liability from people who
are harmed by their products.215 In fact, compliance with regulations often
insulates producers from liability for actual harm done.
"Our freedom of choice in a competitive society rests on the fact that, if
one person refuses to satisfy our wishes, we can turn to another. But if we
face a monopolist we are at his mercy. And an authority directing the whole
economic system would be the most powerful monopolist conceivable."216
213. EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 121.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. HAYEK, supra note 70, at 102.
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V. CONCLUSION

"The fundamental principle that in the ordering of our affairs we should
make as much use as possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and
resort as little as possible to coercion, is capable of an infinite variety of
applications."2" 7 We will never have a perfect food system, for it is filled with
fallible people. We will never have risk-free food, just as we will never have
2"' Reductions
risk-free anything.
in product risk occur over time as
technology advances, but "at any point in time, with a given level of
technology and structure of public tastes, perfect safety is not optimal."" 9
Any market failures are dwarfed by the reality of regulatory failures and the
high cost of regulatory "success." The answer isn't more government
control or involvement; it's less.
The danger is not immediate, it is true .... Yet, though the road
be long, it is one on which it becomes more difficult to turn back
as one advances. If in the long run we are the makers of our own
fate, in the short run we are the captives of the ideas we have
created. Only if we recognize the danger in time can we hope to
avert it.22°
In food safety regulation, we must get off this regulatory road to serfdom,
and we must work towards reapplying the ideals that have proven their
efficacy in the history of the United States, and the western world before.
We are ready to accept almost any explanation of the present
crisis of our civilization except one: that the present state of the
217. Id.
at 21.
218. James Edwards discusses the tension between safety and cost within the framework
of product safety being incapable of perfection, saying:
Products (or the workplace) can be engineered for improved safety, but only at
a rising marginal cost for each additional unit of risk reduction. Increasing
product safety thus increases the cost of the product unless other features,
which may be as valuable to consumers, are reduced to offset the higher cost of
improved safety. Producers try to find a combination of product features
including safety that most satisfies customers, and since customers differ in
their risk attitudes, different producers will fill different segments of the
market. Product safety will therefore vary across producers, as will other quality
dimensions, just as the auto industry offers Cadillacs at one end of the
spectrum and Yugos at the other. The process constitutes an efficient matching
of scarce resources to the spectrum of public tastes and needs.
EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 118-19.
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world may be the result of genuine error on our own part and
that the pursuit of some of our most cherished ideals has
apparently produced results utterly different from those which
we expected.22'
In our culture of fear-mongering media, we have stopped thinking about
the goal of regulation, and seek only to do something-anything-in
response to any particular perceived problem that arises.22 We must not
lose sight of the most critical aspect in ensuring safety: integrity, not
infrastructure. We must not lose sight of the importance of individual
choice and we must not accept the viability of a paternalistic government
that will "protect" us from ourselves, thinking that it knows better than us.
"It is often said that political freedom is without value in the absence of
economic freedom."223 But economic freedom is not to be free of the need
and the power to choose, but rather freedom over our economic activity,
2 24
with both the risk and the responsibility of that right.

221. Id. at 13-14. Hayek is referring to the crisis of World War II; however, the principle
applies today. Id. at 14.
222. It is a historical reality that government growth in America has largely followed
times of perceived or actual crises. EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 197. Traditional policies and
institutions are deemed inadequate to address a particular crisis that arises and power and
oversight are expanded. Id. When the crisis is over, the extension of power subsides a little,
but never as much as it expanded. Id. Thus, "government power and authority ratchets up
over time." Id. In food safety, every perceived crisis leads to this ramp up in this power and
regulatory expansion, but without much contraction. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the
reaction to the fiction novel, The Jungle). Here, the market had already responded to what
was perceived as unsafe food by major consumer drop in demand for the product. Id. The
policies that arose from the Great Depression in the United States are one of the most
significant examples of the tendency for a call to action with major unintended consequences
that fall on those who call for it. ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 159 (Indep. Inst. 2012).

[Elvery collectivist revolution rides in on a Trojan horse of "Emergency." It was
a tactic of Lenin, Hitler, and Mussolini. In the collectivist sweep over a dozen
minor countries of Europe, it was the cry of the men striving to get on
horseback. And "Emergency" became the justification of the subsequent steps.
This technique of creating emergency is the greatest achievement that
demagoguery attains. The invasion of New Deal Collectivism was introduced
by this same Trojan Horse.
Id. at 159 (quoting President Herbert Hoover).
223. HAYEK, supra note 70, at 110.
224. Id.atllO-11.

